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Abstract
China’s rapid economic development, especially in the financial sector, has ignited the discussion of the re-
emergence of Shanghai as a leading international financial center (IFC). Much still remains to be done for
Shanghai to catch up with established centers such as New York and London, including deepening its capital
markets and opening itself up to cross-border capital flows. While Shanghai’s current financial development
has been made possible largely by China’s past economic conditions and policies, recent reforms are also likely
to guarantee Shanghai the position as a world-class onshore IFC in the near future. The rise of Shanghai will
likely benefit China’s economic structure, as well as that of Asia-Pacific region and the whole world.
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I. Introduction 
 
The financial history of pre-1949 China largely focuses on one city - Shanghai. 
It is located at the juncture of Huangpu and Yangtze River, right before the latter 
joins the Pacific Ocean. Opened up to foreign trade since 1841, Shanghai had 
developed itself into the largest and most prosperous financial center in the Far 
East by 1930. In the decade before the Second World War, Shanghai hosted 24 
state banks, 33 foreign banks and over 200 private lenders, trust companies and 
other financial institutions1. Along with London and New York, Shanghai also 
housed one of the largest stock markets in the world. 
 
Devastated during the Sino-Japanese War and consequently shut down for 
financial activities under communist rule until 1978, Shanghai restarted its 
economic reform in the year 1990, a decade after China’s initial national 
economic reforms. Shanghai’s economy has since been growing at a rate above 12% 
annually, and financial activities have started to regain solid status on the city’s 
ground. Today, Shanghai is the largest financial center of mainland China and has 
been trying to become once again the leading international financial center (IFC) 
of Asia, a status it has lost to competitors: Tokyo, Hong Kong and Singapore. In 
March 2009, China’s State Council formally stated that “Shanghai will be built 
into an international financial center in correspondence to the size of China’s 
economy and RMB’s international position in 2020.”2 The ambition goes as far 
as to make Shanghai a leading world-class IFC, competitor on par with London 
and New York. 
 
It is clear that some gaps still exist between today’s Shanghai and the 
established IFCs, however, such as London, New York and Tokyo. Some of the 
most apparent differences include Shanghai’s relatively shallow capital markets 
and low level of cross-border capital flows. While some discussion has been 
initiated regarding Shanghai’s IFC development, a more complete and empirical 
analysis has yet to be produced. The key question to be asked is: what are the 
fundamental factors that have driven Shanghai to its current IFC position, and 
how will they continue to impact its IFC ambition in the future? Building on 
                                                        
1
 The Banker, March 2003 
2
 People’s Daily, March 26, 2009 
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various literatures, this paper attempts to measure Shanghai’s current IFC 
development situated in the interplay of China’s politics and economy, and 
analyzes its future IFC potential based on recent changes in China’s 
macroeconomic environment and development strategies. 
 
After the second part of literature review, the third part of the paper presents 
Shanghai’s general conditions in context to China’s macro political-economy. The 
study finds that although Shanghai has already acquired the basic functions of a 
leading IFC, it is still relatively underdeveloped in two key areas: capital markets 
and cross-border financial activities. In particular, development for the latter is 
falling behind those of other centers by a large margin, mainly due to China’s use 
of capital control. 
 
The fourth part focuses on Shanghai’s capital market development and 
discusses its future potential, based on various reforms China has initiated in the 
recent period. The third part studies China’s capital control in its macroeconomic 
context since 1978, and gauges how recent changes in the exchange rate regime 
could benefit Shanghai as more international capital flows are welcomed. 
 
It is concluded that Shanghai can improve its IFC status by building stronger 
capital markets and embracing financial openness, which will depend largely on 
the development of China’s macro-economy. Given the current conditions and 
recent trends, Shanghai is likely to become a leading IFC in the near future, 
benefitting China’s economy as well as that of the whole world. 
 
II. Literature Review 
 
Due to the multi-faceted nature of IFC development and its engaging 
relationship with various aspects of the economy, different theories have been 
proposed to study IFCs in different contexts. As pointed out by Jarvis (2007), at 
least four separate but related schools of research have been developed regarding 
IFCs, loosely classified as Place Theory, World Cities, Scale Economies, and 
Endowed Capacities. 
 
While the existence of financial centers can be traced back to ancient times, 
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modern IFCs with global influence only emerged in the 1800s with rapid 
developments in intercontinental trade and commerce. Place theory employs 
spatial analysis and factors such as geographic clustering and hinterland proximity 
to study the formation and development of IFCs. Christaller (1966) theorized that 
goods and services have different “threshold” values, and the higher the value, the 
more willing consumers will be to travel for them. The location of cities is thus 
critical in deciding their importance in the economy, as ones with higher 
accessibility are more likely to become commercial and trading centers. Financial 
services such as trading in capital markets and banking activities are goods with 
high “threshold” value for which consumers are willing to travel long distances, 
which eventually leads to the formation of a popular and geographically 
accessible IFC against an “economic hinterland”. 
 
Sassen (2001) provided a theoretical framework of World Cities based on the 
Place Theory in her work, The Global City: New York, London, Tokyo. In this 
work, she popularized the terminology, global city, describing a city that conducts 
a disproportionate amount of international financial activities and thus serves as 
an important node in the global economic system. This term has since been used 
somewhat interchangeably with international financial center (IFC). It is global 
cities, Sassen argued, that hosted globalization through their role as “nodes of 
global activities”. The social and economic activities of a host country, as well as 
their cultural influence, are first clustered in its global cities. They are then 
“exported” to global cities in other parts of the world, before eventually spreading 
to the “hinterland” of the rest of the world. 
 
One notable empirical work in the field of World Cities was developed by 
Reed (1980), who studied the ascent of Tokyo as the leading IFC among 17 Asian 
centers in the period from 1900-1975. Reed paid much of his attention to 
cross-border financial linkages between centers and constructed an IFC evaluation 
index including variables such as bank links and banks’ financial assets 
(Appendix II). While being overly simplistic as a complete ranking method for 
IFCs, Reed’s research method did provide insights into the importance of 
international financial linkages in IFCs’ development. 
 
Scale Economies Theory interprets the formation of IFCs as the results of 
financial activities clustering. Due to efficiency-gains associated with economies 
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of scale, clustered financial activities tend to reduce transaction costs and create 
information symmetries as well as knowledge economies (Tschoegl, 2000). IFCs’ 
city-level economic aspects such as capital market development, presence of large 
global companies and internationally influential banking institutions are thus the 
subject of this field of study. 
 
Traditionally, Place Theory, World Cities Theory and Scale Economies Theory 
have held the dominant position in the IFC literature. Using factors proposed by 
them, a trend has been popular to measure cities’ IFC status based on various 
financial measurements. Laurenceson, Tang & Wong (2003) conducted a case 
study of Shanghai, which used indicators on both macroeconomic and 
microeconomic levels to measure Shanghai’s IFC development. Other works on 
Shanghai have focused more closely on the financial sector. McCauley & Chan 
(2005) compared Shanghai’s financial development to that of Hong Kong in their 
working paper Hong Kong and Shanghai: Yesterday, today and tomorrow. They 
placed side by side the two cities’ detailed capital market indicators and 
cross-border financial activities data. Like Laurenceson, Tang & Wong, they 
concluded that Shanghai’s IFC development lagged behind those of competing 
centers such as Hong Kong and Singapore, with large margins in some key areas 
seemingly impossible to cover. 
 
While comparison studies mentioned above can be informative and 
provocative, they have consistently been myopic and fell into simple tautology. 
More interesting to economists and more instructive to policy makers is the 
historical context of these statistics and macroeconomic reasons behind IFCs’ 
current status (Kriz, 2007). They are particularly important to developing 
countries, where past economic conditions are constantly being replaced by new 
ones, and IFCs’ development adjusts accordingly to new policies, trade 
opportunities and human capital flows. Recently, the fourth direction of study on 
IFCs, loosely termed as the Endowed Capacities theory, has focused on 
researching an IFC’s development in its host country’s macroeconomic and 
political context. Although this school of thought is still nascent, the rising status 
of developing countries has required more academic work to study their IFCs 
based on these countries’ specific conditions.  
 
Hong Kong and Shanghai as China’s Window to Global Capital (Meyer, 2004) 
4
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discussed Shanghai’s rise as an IFC based on the broader context of China’s 
development in international capital flows. The study argued that Shanghai’s 
re-emergence as an IFC has largely been due to China’s rising global economic 
status, and Shanghai’s future development will eventually depend on China’s 
embrace of global financial integration. Similarly, other studies conducted on 
Shanghai have also argued that the lifting of capital control will determine its 
future IFC status, implying that Shanghai will need to become internationally 
open before being internationally dominant (Wong, 2004; Li, 2009). Cainey 
(2010), however, argued that only partial liberalization would be sufficient for 
Shanghai to achieve the objective set by China’s state council to be the leading 
IFC by 2020. An increasing concentration of China’s domestic financial activities, 
coupled with Shanghai’s leading position in mainland China’s capital markets, 
will boost the city’s development as an influential IFC. Shanghai will retain much 
of its business on China’s domestic needs, given the size of the country’s growing 
economy and its dire need for financial diversity and depth.  
 
The above literatures present distinct but related analyses on IFCs. They focus 
on different aspects of the complex nature of financial centers, implying that IFCs’ 
development can be influenced by many factors. While Place Theory underlines 
the importance of location and access to hinterland market in IFC formation, 
Scale Economies stresses the role of financial markets’ size and the diversity of 
their products. Endowed Capacities theory assumes, however, that intentional 
public policy and government support could create or improve the institutional 
and infrastructural environment critical to IFC development (Jarvis, 2007).  
 
Shanghai’s historical position as the leading IFC in the Far East and its current 
place as the dragon’s head of China’s financial activities have eclipsed the role of 
Place Theory and Scale Economies Theory. What is most notable in Shanghai’s 
case is the change in its financial center status from the past, and its development 
potential for the future. The phoenix-like re-emergence of Shanghai is closely 
related to China’s economic reforms, and subsequent changes in the 
macroeconomic environment and policy institutions. Thus, the focus of this paper 
lies primarily in the field of Endowed Capacities theory.  
 
On one hand, previous research on Shanghai in the Endowed Capacities 
framework has been largely plagued by the lack of supporting empirical evidence. 
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On the other hand, statistical comparison studies have ignored Shanghai’s 
historical background and thus fail to provide an understanding of reasons behind 
its current conditions. The method used in this research is dual-headed, both 
aiming to measure Shanghai’s current performance in historical context and 
providing insights into its future potential.  
 
III. Shanghai: Yesterday, Today and Tomorrow 
 
Shanghai is currently the dominant commercial and financial center of 
mainland China. While before 1949 it was the undisputable leading IFC of Asia, 
its financial and commercial function was mostly disassembled from 1949 
onwards. Many entrepreneurs and financiers fled from Shanghai to Hong Kong, 
Taiwan or overseas; those still operating in Shanghai were all nationalized by 
1956. Shanghai Stock Exchange was shut down for speculation and FOREX 
trading in 1950. 
 
  Under the command economy, financial institutions were collectively 
reallocated to Beijing. From 1956 to 1978, Shanghai’s development was directed 
to follow the Soviet mode of heavy industry. Impractical political and economic 
policies nationwide also severely impacted the city’s economy and infrastructure. 
At the same time, Tokyo, Hong Kong, Singapore and other centers developed 
rapidly and secured their leading position in the global economy. When China’s 
economic reform took place in 1978, Shanghai was “a mere shadow of its former 
self…the industrial cash cow of Beijing” (Lai, 2006). Due to its role as the heavy 
tax revenue contributor to the central government, Shanghai’s economic reform 
did not take place until the 1990s. During this period, Shanghai’s development 
largely lagged behind cities in the Pearl River Delta and other development zones 
in the southeast: Shenzhen, Zhuhai, Shantou and Xiamen, which had received 
special treatment and were granted semi-autonomous political and economic rule 
since 1978. 
 
In 1990-1991, Shanghai was granted these privileges in China’s second round 
of economic reforms, partially for political reasons, as the government wanted to 
show the outside world that it planned to continue reforms after the Tiananmen 
Square incident (Gold, 1991). Shanghai’s economic growth rate surpassed the 
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national level in 1992 and has been growing 12% annually on average. Since 
2009, Shanghai is the largest city-level economy in China and has one of the 
highest GDP per capita in mainland China. Through its presence in China’s most 
important economic zone, the Yangtze River Delta, Shanghai also exerts influence 
on the national economy (Table 1). 
 
Table 1: Context of Shanghai in China 
 Nominal GDP 
(billion USD) 
GDP Per 
Capita 
Population 
(million) 
Land Area 
(km2) 
Yangtze River Delta 
(YRD) 
1,051.2 7,116 147.7 210,740 
Shanghai 218.2 11,355.2 19.2 6,340 
Zhejiang 334.3 6,491.2 51.5 101,800 
Jiangsu 498.7 6,476.1 77.0 102,600 
Pearl River Delta (PRD) 808.5 7814.1 103.5 179,033 
Hong Kong 215.1 30,700.1 7.0 1,104 
Macau 21.1 38,795.4 0.5 29 
Shenzhen 120.1 13,590.0 8.9 2,050 
Rest of Guangdong 452.1 5,966.0 86.0 175,850 
Bohai Economic Rim 
(BER) 
766.0 5,740.4 133.4 273,878 
Beijing 173.7 9,899.3 17.6 16,808 
Tianjian 109.8 9,136.6 12.0 11,920 
Shandong 247.5 5,241.0 47.2 78,350 
Hebei 124.6 3,555.3 35.1 93,850 
China 4,910 3,613.9 1,358.7 9,630,960 
 
Shanghai (as % of China) 4.4% 314% 1.41% 0.05% 
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YRD (as % of China) 21.4% 197% 10.9% 2.2% 
PRD (as % of China) 16.5% 216% 7.6% 1.9% 
BER (as % of China) 15.6% 159% 9.8% 2.8% 
 
Source: Eoyang, Lui & Koul (2010). 
 
 
Shanghai Stock Exchange was re-founded in December 1990 as one of only 
two exchanges on the mainland, stimulating the growth of China’s financial 
market (the other stock exchange is the smaller Shenzhen Stock Exchange). 
Foreign financial institutions in Shanghai were allowed to open branches in 1990 
and to conduct local currency business since 1996. Financial activities gradually 
expanded their presence in Shanghai, especially in the sub-district Lujiazui in 
Pudong. In 2009, Shanghai is the largest commercial and financial hub of 
mainland China, hosting 133 banks, 307 insurance providers and 93 security firms. 
Among the total 787 financial institutions, 170 are foreign entities. 
 
Shanghai’s economic development has also been concentrated on a diversified 
tertiary/services sector and foreign trade. The tertiary sector has gained the 
dominant position in Shanghai’s economy, accounting for 59% of the total GDP in 
2010, compared with China’s overall level of 39.1%. Commerce and financial 
services make the top two subsectors within the tertiary sector, with the latter’s 
value reaching 26.41 billion USD in 2009 (Figure 1). 
 
Figure 1: Shanghai’s Tertiary Sector and Financial Services Development (in Billion USD) 
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 Source: Shanghai Statistical Yearbook. 
 
Being the largest port in the world in terms of total cargo transported, Shanghai 
has also been the most open part of China’s economy. It is the recipient of the 
largest foreign direct investment (FDI) in China, with aggregate investment 
volume constantly surpassing that of external-focused centers such as Hong Kong 
and Singapore (Table 2). In contrast to more mature IFCs like London, Shanghai’s 
advantage in attracting FDI also boosts its rapid economic development. It is 
noticeable that Shanghai has gradually started its outflow of FDI, which, despite 
its small size, shows the possibility of Shanghai to increase its international 
influence. 
 
Table 2: Annual FDIs in billion USD/percentage share in city GDP 
 2005 2007 2009 2005 2007 2009 
 FDI Inflow FDI Outflow 
Shanghai 13.8/12.2% 14.9/9.05% 13.3/6.04% 6.8/0.006% 6.5/0.004% 15/0.007% 
Hong 
Kong 
4.9/2.8% 7.8/3.78% 6.9/3.27% 3.95/2.22% 8.8/4.25% 7.4/3.53% 
London 0.87/0.26% 0.9/0.23% 0.22/0.07% 0.4/0.12% 1.6/0.4% 0.09/0.03
% 
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Singapore 3.62/2.89% 7.97/4.51% 3.55/1.95% 2.63/2.1% 6.16/3.49% 1.26/0.69
% 
Source: Shanghai Statistical Yearbook, Singapore Yearbook, Oxford Economics, UNCTAD Statistic Data, 
author’s estimation.  
 
In 2010, Shanghai ranked sixth on Global Financial Centres Index (GFIC) 
published by the City of London (Figure 2), and 8th on Xinhua-Dow Jones IFC 
Development Index (Appendix III). This ranking is highest among all IFCs in 
developing economies, limiting competitors in Shanghai’s leading IFC ambition 
to a handful of cities: New York, London, Tokyo, Hong Kong, Singapore, Paris 
and Frankfurt. Shanghai’s IFC potential, however, is far from being fully realized. 
 
Figure 2: Shanghai’s IFC Development 
 
Source: Global Financial Centres Index 1-8. 
 
Montes (1999) classified financial centers’ functions into four categories 
according to the capital intermediation role they perform (Table 3). Type A is 
considered the least sophisticated, and for a center to be considered an 
“International” Financial Center, it must display at least some features relating to 
types B to D, which involve the exchange of capital flows between the domestic 
market and foreign market. 
 
Table 3: Four types of financial centers’ functions 
500
550
600
650
700
750
800
850
2007 2008 2009 2010
New York
London
Tokyo
Hong Kong
Shanghai
Paris
Frankfurt
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Type A Center 
Domestic to 
Domestic 
Intermediaries between domestic providers of capital 
and domestic users of capital 
Type B Center 
Domestic to 
Foreign 
Intermediaries between foreign providers of capital 
and domestic users of capital 
Type C Center 
Foreign to 
Domestic 
Intermediaries between domestic providers of capital 
and foreign users of capital 
Type D Center 
Foreign to 
Foreign 
Intermediaries between foreign providers of capital 
and foreign users of capital 
Source: Montes (1999). 
 
 Leading IFCs listed above have generally established mature mechanisms of 
cross-border capital flows and perform well in B to D functions. While Hong 
Kong and Singapore’s type D feature is strong (Yue, 2011; Huat et al, 2004), New 
York and Tokyo exhibit predominant powers in type B function (Bloomberg et al., 
2007; International Bankers Association, 2007). London functions most diversely 
among all leading IFCs, serving as the base for constant capital flows between 
UK and other parts of the world (Z/Yen, 2005).  
 
Shanghai, on the other side, functions primarily as a type A center, dealing 
with domestic suppliers and users of capital. While Shanghai does display some 
features of types B to D, they are relatively overshadowed by the size of its 
domestic transactions (Eoyang, Lui & Koul, 2010). Shanghai’s weakness in 
international financial business is closely linked with China’s current economic 
conditions and cannot be discussed separately from the country’s exchange rate 
regime and long-term control on cross-border capital flows. On the other hand, 
China’s recent plan to internationalize its currency Renminbi (RMB or yuan) has 
also initiated a series of regulatory reforms that imply liberalization of 
cross-border capital flows. As they make up one of the most critical part in cities’ 
IFC status, the author has devoted section V to the analysis of China’s exchange 
rate policy and capital control management. 
 
The last point to address is Shanghai’s ongoing development in infrastructure, 
both on the “hard-side” of physical infrastructure and on the “soft-side” of 
institutions and human capital. Shanghai has focused its development on the 
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“hard-side” since 1990s, and much of the infrastructure had already been built by 
2010, especially in advance of the World Exposition. Shanghai now has two 
world-class international airports, the world’s busiest port and longest metro 
network, which includes the world’s first maglev train. Hosting two “super tall” 
skyscrapers: Shanghai World Financial Center (492m) and Jin Mao Tower (421m), 
Shanghai also has one of the largest number of office buildings among all IFCs. 
   
However, Shanghai still needs to improve its “soft-side”, including general 
legal and financial institutions, as well as human capital. Currently, 3.3% of 
Shanghai’s population works in the financial services industry, half the percentage 
of that in New York, Tokyo, London and Hong Kong (Eoyang, Lui & Koul). 
While this may seem to be a large margin, experience from the European Union 
does tell that human capital moves quickly with globalization (Heinz & 
Ward-Warmedinger, 2006). In fact, the number of foreign financial services 
employees in Shanghai has doubled during 2003-2009, reaching 150,000. 
 
China’s legal and financial institutions are generally underdeveloped. 
Shanghai, however, has amended 22 laws and regulations since 1998 and enjoys a 
certain level of political and economic autonomy3. The research has also shown 
that institutions do tend to improve with the growth in the market, given the right 
political and economic situations. 
 
IV. Capital Markets in Shanghai 
 
In the following section I outline the current status of three major capital 
markets in Shanghai, as well as analyze the reasons behind their current situation 
and discuss space for improvements. I begin with the stock exchange, as it is often 
regarded as one of the most important aspect of a city’s IFC function (Z/Yen, 
2007-2010). Bond market plays a less significant role in Shanghai’s capital 
markets, as the majority of China’s bond trading takes place on China’s Interbank 
market. Last I discuss Shanghai’s derivatives market and aim to connect the 
discussion with that of China’s cross-border capital flow in Part V. 
 
Shanghai Stock Exchange 
                                                        
3
 People’s Daily, August 20, 2010 
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 The original Shanghai Stock Exchange (SSE) was founded in 1891, first known 
as the “Shanghai Sharebrokers’ Association”. In 1930s, it reached a dominant 
position in Asian financial markets, topping competitors such as Tokyo and Hong 
Kong by a large margin. From 1950-1990, however, SSE was shut down under 
communist rule. In December 1990, SSE was reopened and has since experienced 
exponential growth. Figure 3 shows the growth of SSE in terms of number of 
firms listed, number of securities listed in SSE, and its market capitalization. 
 
Figure 3: Growth of Shanghai Stock Exchange 
 
Source: Annual Report 2009, Shanghai Stock Exchange. 
 
In 1990, there were 8 companies on Shanghai Stock Exchange. By the end of 
2009, there were 870 companies and 1351 securities listed. Among them are some 
of the world’s largest corporations (numbers in brackets are their Financial Times 
global rankings by market capitalization in December 2010): PetroChina (2), 
Industrial and Commercial Bank of China (5), Bank of China (33) and Sinopec 
(49). In July 2010, together with Hong Kong Stock Exchange (HKSE), SSE 
hosted the largest IPO in world history: Agricultural Bank of China at $22.1 
billion. 
 
The average growth rate of SSE’s market capitalization has been 162% over the 
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past twenty years. While the growth rate was extremely high in the mid-1990s, it 
gradually slowed down by the early 2000s. In 2006-2007, Chinese investors 
flocked to SSE under over-optimism and its market capitalization grew over 277% 
in one year, only to fall by 64% in the global financial crisis in 2008. In 2009, 
however, SSE again showed strong growth momentum of 90%. 
 
In 2009, SSE makes Shanghai host to the fourth largest stock market in the 
world, both in terms of market capitalization and trading volume. Figure 4 shows 
four largest stock exchanges in 2009 after New York. While SSE’s size was 
relatively insignificant compared with other three centers in 2006, it grew to 
surpass HKSE’s position to become the fourth largest after New York, Tokyo and 
London in 2007.  
 
 
Figure 4: Comparison of four major stock exchanges  
 
Source: World Federation of Exchanges. 
 
While SSE is quickly catching up with the London Stock Exchange (LSE) and 
Tokyo Stock Exchange (TSE) in term of market capitalization, other market 
indicators also demonstrate its significant growth over recent years. Daily 
turnover on SSE increased more than twenty times in 2005-2009, from 1/18 that 
of TSE to 14% larger. At the same time, funds raised in SSE increased by 15 
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times, making it one of the most profitable exchanges worldwide (Table 4). 
 
 
 
Table 4: Comparison of Stock Market Indicators 
US$ Billion Hong Kong Shanghai Tokyo London 
 2005 2009 2005 2009 2005 2009 2005 2009 
 
Capitalization 1051.7 2305.1 34.0501 2704.8 4901.8 3306.1 3242.9 2796.4 
Daily Turnover 
Funds Raised 
Listed firms # 
Domestic 
Foreign 
2.3415 
38.401 
934 
925 
9 
7.9993 
82.273 
1145 
- 
- 
0.9704 
3.6586 
834 
834 
0 
20.790 
48.943 
870 
870 
0 
18.229 
28.096 
2351 
2323 
28 
16.419 
66.889 
2334 
2319 
15 
22.536 
24.731 
1358 
- 
- 
13.403 
115.84 
1121 
- 
- 
Source: World Federation of Exchange, Hong Kong Stock Exchange Fact Book; Shanghai 
Stock Exchange Fact Book; Tokyo Stock Exchange Fact Book; London Stock Exchange 
Monthly Statistics. 
 
However, SSE’s market capitalization is still relatively shallow while measured 
against its share of the national economy compared with some other major 
economies of the world. While taking into consideration the fluctuation of the 
stock market’s capitalization during the financial crisis, the percentage share of 
U.S. and U.K. exchanges constantly exceed 60% of the GDP. In comparison, 
SSE’s market capitalization, despite its relatively large size among the group, was 
overshadowed when measured against the size of China’s economy (Figure 5). 
 
Figure 5: Major Stock Markets percentage share of national GDP, 2009 
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Notes: Floating bars indicate standard variation calculated based on Stock Market 
Capitalization to GDP ratio. U.S. figure includes NYSE Euronext (US) and NASDAQ. India 
figure includes Mumbai SE and National Stock Exchange Ind
Exchanges. 
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currently seeking to open and deepen its capital market, more instruments have 
been pipelined for the near future. (See Derivatives Market in Shanghai section.)  
 
Another piece of evidence comes from that fact that the number of firms listed 
on SSE only increased slightly from 2006 to 2009. During the same period, the 
listing increase on HKSE was three times larger, most of which were companies 
based in mainland China. The major cause behind this drastic difference is that 
SSE is still mostly isolated from global investors, and companies preferring 
foreign capital and subsequent benefits in overseas markets look to raise capital in 
other markets.   
 
From one side, SSE has not yet fully opened itself up to foreign investment. In 
the past, SSE shares were divided between A-shares and B-shares, where A shares 
were open to domestic investors and B shares designated to limited foreign 
investors. The B-share market became open to domestic investors in March 2001, 
and its previous function was largely replaced by the Qualified Foreign 
Institutional Investor scheme (QFII) in 2002. QFII has allowed foreign investors 
to invest in A-share market directly, but under a fixed quota and more strict CSRC 
supervision. As of 2009, a total of 79 foreign institutional investors have been 
allowed access to SSE. However, the total quota of QFIIs is only $30 billion, a 
mere 1.1% of SSE’s market capitalization. The major reason for such a small 
share is that China is still on its way to lifting its capital control (see Part V). As a 
result, domestic firms who are more internationally oriented hesitate to list on 
SSE, as it is much more difficult to be accessed by its overseas investors: for 
companies that list on both HKSE and SSE, their HKSE listing prices constantly 
enjoy a premium over those on SSE. 
 
From the other side, SSE is still dominated by domestic companies, especially 
large state-owned enterprises (SOEs). Foreign listing remains absent (Table 4). 
Shanghai municipal government is currently working with central authorities to 
initiate SSE’s International Board in 2011, which it hopes will attract the listing of 
large and internationally known companies. Blue-chip Chinese companies that 
have been listed on foreign exchanges, as well as Red-chip SOEs listed on HKSE, 
are also expected to return to SSE’s international board, as the premium between 
the two closes and China favors listing on domestic exchanges. HSBC, Wal-Mart, 
Siemens and other firms have expressed keen interest in SSE’s international 
17
Luo: Shanghai as an International Financial Center
Published by Digital Commons @ IWU, 2011
board4, which will directly define Shanghai’s function as a Type C financial center, 
conducting domestic credit to foreign users of capital via its financial institutions.  
 
Bond Market in Shanghai 
 
SSE also hosts an order-driven bond market, which is governed directly by the 
Chinese Securities Regulatory Commission (CSRC). In 2009, the total value of 
bond instruments listed on SSE amounted to $ 267.31 billion and a trading value 
56.73 $ billion, accounting for around 3% of China’s total bond trading activities. 
Major investors in SSE’s bond market are small and medium participants via 
brokerage services providers. China’s quote-driven OTC market, Interbank 
Market, hosted the dominant 97% share of bond trading (Zeng, 2009). 
 
Among bonds issued, Government Bonds, Central Bank Bills and Policy Bank 
Bonds account for the largest majority, reflecting the weak position of China’s 
corporate bonds. Historically, issuance of corporate bonds was rampant from 
mid-1980s when SOEs were first allowed to raise funds through bonds issuance. 
However, the subsequent market-economy reforms drove many uncompetitive 
SOEs to bankruptcy and created a few waves of bond defaults in the early 1990s 
(Zeng, 2009). The issuance of corporate bonds has since declined sharply and 
been tightly regulated. It was not until 2006 that the first corporate credit bond 
re-emerged without a bank guarantee. However, corporate bonds have seen strong 
growth in the recent years as CSRC gradually alleviates the control in face of their 
better performances. As seen in Table 5, the amount of bonds traded on SSE 
increased five times between 2005 and 2009. 
 
Table 5: Comparison of Bond Markets 
US$ Billion Hong Kong Shanghai Tokyo London 
 2005 2009 2005 2009 2005 2009 2005 2009 
 
Value Listed 
 
Value Traded 
 
55.46 
 
0.0014 
 
50.54 
 
0.0005 
 
181.59 
 
39.3465 
 
267.31 
 
56.731 
 
4730.8 
 
6.0756 
 
6346.5 
 
5.0667 
 
2574.3 
 
3008.7 
 
4841.5 
 
6943.3 
Public Sector 0 NA 33.889 30.148 0.006 0.0003 2946.8 6883.5 
                                                        
4
 People’s Daily, June 10, 2010 
18
Undergraduate Economic Review, Vol. 8 [2011], Iss. 1, Art. 14
http://digitalcommons.iwu.edu/uer/vol8/iss1/14
Private Sector 
Foreign Sector 
0.0014 
0 
Source: World Federation of Exchange, Hong Kong Stock Exchange Fact Book; Shanghai 
Stock Exchange Fact Book; Tokyo Stock Exchange Fact Book; London Stock Exchange 
Monthly Statistics. 
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Figure 6: External financing for Chinese companies
Source: China Capital Markets Development Report
 
Improvements in Shanghai’s 
number of corporations that
of firms listed on the bond market 
ties with banks and only raise
the other hand, small and 
Bonds, 10.10%
Stocks, 3.90%
NA 
NA 
5.458 
0 
26.583 
0 
6.069 
0 
5.066 
0 
30.808
31.028
it is still less when compared with Tokyo and 
Interbank Market. It is also because 
 developed due to only the recent emergence 
the equity market, China’s bond market is 
and companies’ external financing options (Figure 
 
, CSRC. 2008 
bond market need to focus on increasing 
 raise funds through bond issuance. On one hand, 70% 
are large SOEs, which prefer their established 
 10.1% of their funds through the bond market
medium enterprises (SMEs) in China generally
Bank Loans, 
84.90%
ABS, 1.10%
 
 
35.003 
24.833 
97% of 
largely 
 
the 
. On 
 have 
19
Luo: Shanghai as an International Financial Center
Published by Digital Commons @ IWU, 2011
neither banking nor bond market access due to limiting credit policies (Aziz & 
Cui, 2010). As they account for more than 60% of the total economy, SMEs’ 
financing demand implies a huge potential for China’s bond market and 
consequent benefits for Shanghai.  
 
In 2009, the authorities announced that one of its core economic policies in the 
near future would be supplying SMEs with easier channels to raise funds.5 
Recent advancements have been largely focused on the construction of credit 
institutions, such as a national social credit system. Emergence of domestic rating 
agencies is also likely to facilitate the integration of SMEs into the financial 
market. In addition, the State Council has also proposed that Shanghai enhance 
the linkage between SSE bond market and the Interbank Bond Market, as well as 
attract foreign corporations to issue debt in China’s bond market. 
 
Derivatives Markets in Shanghai 
 
Shanghai hosts one of the three major commodity exchange markets in China: 
Shanghai Futures Exchange (SFE). SFE was formed from the amalgamation of 
three previous exchanges in 1999, and engages primarily in commodity futures 
trading (gold, copper, aluminum, rubber, steel rebar etc.).The other two major 
commodity exchanges are Zhengzhou Commodity Exchange (ZCE) and Dalian 
Commodity Exchange (DCE), which focus on agricultural commodities 
(soybeans, corn, sugar, cotton etc.). In 2006, China Financial Futures Exchange 
(CFFE) was also established as a joint venture of the three exchanges. 
 
 In 2009, the total number of contracts traded on SFE reached 400 million, 
ranking seventh out of 45 global financial centers (Table 6). However, the total 
trade size of SFE is still relatively small. Derivatives trading volume in Shanghai 
is only one-seventh that in New York and one-half that of London, even lagging 
behind those of centers from developing economies such as Mumbai and Sao 
Paulo.  
 
Table 6: IFCs’ derivatives trading volume, 2006-2009. Number of contracts in million 
Centers 2006 2007 2008 2009 
    
 
                                                        
5
 Xinhua, 24, December, 2009 
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Chicago 2885.895 4079.613 4475.769 3603.454 
Seoul 2593.61 2777.42 2867.28 3102.89 
New York 1293.73 1791.76 2179.34 2239.66 
Mumbai 0.533 385.923 707.098 1304.101 
Sao Paulo 561.823 746.261 714.303 883.775 
London 909.977 1180.411 834.889 883.762 
Shanghai 58.106 85.564 140.263 434.864 
Sources: World Federation of Exchange. 
 
The large gap between SFE’s overall trading volume and those of leading 
derivatives market is due to the fact that Shanghai lacks many other derivatives 
instruments, which have yet to be authorized by regulators. Currently, there is 
only one major product traded on SFE: commodity futures. As a matter of fact, 
SFE is the third largest commodities exchange by trading volume in the world 
(after ZCE and DCE), and its increasing volume in metal trading has successfully 
challenged London’s global dominance in setting future prices for zinc, as well as 
significant influenced global copper and aluminum prices (Wu, 2009). As China’s 
appetite for commodities continues to grow due to its ongoing infrastructure 
construction, the trading volume of commodities futures on SFE is also expected 
to continue growing strongly.  
Thus, while the gap between overall derivatives markets in Shanghai and in 
other centers such as London and Tokyo seems to be large, it is mainly because 
Shanghai has only recently started testing other derivatives products (Table 7). 
For example, one of the most importantly traded derivatives worldwide is Stock 
Index Futures, which emerged in North America, and gained subsequent footing 
in Europe and Asia. They account for a large portion of total derivatives traded in 
many Asian IFCs (94.1% in Seoul, for example). However, China’s Stock Index 
Futures development had been stagnant before 2005, mainly due to the fact that 
only 1/3 of shares from listed companies were freely tradable. The remaining 2/3 
were either held by government or by related entities and thus not in market 
circulation. The reforms of untradeable shares, aimed to release the untradeable 
shares into secondary market, started in 2005. During the following years, the 
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majority of listed companies finished the reform process and provided platform 
for Stock Index Futures. Consequently, it was launched on Shanghai’s CFFE in 
April 2010. 
 
Another important component of the derivatives market is warrant and option. 
While the first warrant in China was introduced by SSE as early as 1992, heavy 
speculation and manipulation of the warrant market led to its demise in 1996. In 
2005, warrants emerged again following reforms in untradeable shares. Currently, 
China’s warrant market has been growing rapidly, even though it lags behind 
those of mature markets in terms of volume, diversity and issuance of covered 
warrants. In some areas, warrants are also interchangeable with options, whose 
development in China also lag due to macroeconomic reasons: the first option in 
China was only created in April 2011, formed as RMB-to-FOREX option and 
served as part of China’s plan to internationalize its currency RMB (see Part V). 
 
Table 7: Comparison of availability of derivatives. “Y” indicates availability 
 Hong 
Kong 
London New York Tokyo Singapore Shanghai 
Single Stock 
Options Y Y Y Y - Warrants 
Single Stock 
Futures 
Y Y - - - - 
Stock Index 
Options Y Y Y Y Y - 
Stock Index 
Futures 
Y Y - Y Y 
Launched 
April 2010 
ETF Options Y Y Y Y - 
Launched 
November 
2011 
ST Interest Rate 
Option - Y 
Pipelined 
in 2011 
Y Y 
Pipelined 
in 2011 
ST Interest Rate 
Futures 
Y Y - Y Y - 
LT Interest Rate 
Option - Y 
Pipelined 
in 2011 
Y - 
Pipelined 
in 2011 
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ST Interest Rate 
Futures 
- Y - Y Y - 
Currency Option - Y - - - 
Launched 
April 2011 
Currency Futures - Y - Y - - 
Commodity 
Options - Y - - - - 
Commodity 
Futures 
Y Y - Y - Y 
Source: World Federation of Exchange. SSE. SFE. CFFE. CSRC. Bank of China. 
 
   Following the call from State Council to build Shanghai into a world-class 
IFC, China Securities Regulatory Commission (CSRC) has recently taken very 
aggressive steps to expand the categories of derivatives available in Shanghai. 
This trend is expected to continue as China’s market further matures and China 
continues to internationalize its currency and alleviate capital control. 
 
Summary 
 
In general, the capital market in Shanghai has the past stage of initial 
development and is on its way to achieve full maturity. However, it is still 
relatively shallow and offers insufficient channels for domestic and foreign 
investment. While much of this has been due to historical reasons, recent reforms 
in different areas have been taking place to enable more diversified instruments 
and boost capital market’s growth in Shanghai. Companies and investors will 
become more willing to participate in Shanghai’s capital market as it becomes 
more mature and more open, augmenting Shanghai’s global financial center 
status. 
 
V. Cross-Border Capital Flow, Capital Control and Fixed Exchange Rate 
Regime: Story of the Past and Changes for the Future 
 
Comparison research done by McCauley & Chan (2007) on Shanghai and 
Hong Kong in 2005 found that the majority of cross-border capital flow indicators 
on Shanghai are virtually zero. This picture still holds true today, as Shanghai’s 
ability to conduct cross-border financial activities remains largely handicapped by 
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China’s fixed exchange rate regime and use of capital control, officially referred 
to as the Foreign Exchange Management Regime (Table 8).  
  
Regarding its external banking position, both absolute value and percentage 
measure for China fall behind those of advanced countries by a large margin. 
While China’s economy surpassed that of Japan in 2010, the latter’s total external 
banking position is three times that of China. Together with the U.S., U.K. hosts a 
large amount of banking assets and liabilities due to its strong international 
banking business, which is almost 21 times that of China. In addition, China’s 
daily turnover in FOREX transaction is minimal compared with that of other 
economies and was almost nonexistence before 2007. 
 
Table 8: External banking positions and FOREX markets vis-à-vis individual countries 
 United 
States Japan 
United 
Kingdom 
Germany Russia South 
Africa 
China 
Assets 5100.807 688.74 4704.592 1671.152 126.034 32.798 241.59 
Liabilities 4481.316 572.33 4608.187 1783.62 97.822 40.321 189.55 
Total 9582.123 1261.1 9312.779 3454.772 223.856 73.119 431.14 
% of 
GDP 
65.5% 23.4% 426.6% 104.5% 15.2% 25.5% 7.3% 
        
FOREX 904.4 312.3 1853.6 108.6 41.7 14.4 19.8 
% of 
GDP 
6.18% 5.79% 84.91% 3.29% 2.82% 5.01% 0.34% 
Notes: In US $ billion. External Banking Positions as in June 2010. FOREX data as daily 
average in April, 2010. China figure does not include Hong Kong and Macau. Source: BIS. 
 
China’s positions in external banking and FOREX are also overshadowed by 
other developing countries in terms of the percentage share in GDP. While 
China’s economy is more than three times that of Russia, the latter’s percentage 
share of external banking asset is twice that of China, and its daily FOREX 
trading volume is eight times greater. Even South Africa, which imposes capital 
controls through market operations such as investment tax, also has more than 
three times the share of external banking assets and fourteen times FOREX 
trading volume as China as percentage against GDP.  
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Scholars have generally agreed that China’s extremely low level of 
cross-border financial activities is caused largely by its use of capital control 
(Xiao & Kimball, 2004; Ma & McCauley, 2007). On one side, capital control 
helps countries to achieve various policy goals such as stability of financial 
market and fixed exchange rate; on the other, it impedes international capital flow 
and prevents global financial integration. In IFC discussions, the presence of 
international capital flow is one of the most important aspects of center 
development (Montes, 1999; Reed, 1980; Leung & Yim, 2009). As indicated by 
Hilgers (2009) and Overholt (2004), Shanghai’s IFC position can be significantly 
boosted if China alleviates its capital control and allows freer cross-border capital 
flow.  
 
This is indeed what is taking place. China has recently started reforms in its 
fixed exchange rate regime and consequently lessened its capital control: in 2005, 
Chinese currency started appreciating against the U.S. dollar; since 2006, Chinese 
residents are allowed to buy foreign equities via the Qualified Domestic 
Institutional Investors (QDII) scheme. Because understanding the trend of reforms 
in capital control is critical in gauging Shanghai’s IFC potential, it is necessary to 
study what has caused China to adopt capital control in the first place, and what 
changes have taken place for reforms to happen. 
 
In the following section, I map out China’s historical economic conditions and 
its reasoning for adopting capital control under a fixed-exchange rate regime. The 
discussion is divided into two parts, as China’s focus on exports growth and 
protection of its financial system both play major roles in influencing the policy 
choices. I also present how changes have occurred in the recent years, enabling 
China to adopt a freer exchange rate and less capital control. To conclude, I 
discuss the impact of the recent debut of RMB internationalization and draw 
implications for Shanghai’s future IFC status. 
 
Exports, Fixed Exchange Rate Regime and Capital Control 
 
China has long been under a fixed exchange regime. Its currency, Renminbi 
(literally people’s currency, short as RMB or yuan) was pegged to the U.S. dollar 
before the breakdown of the Bretton-Woods System and remained a hard pegged 
to the U.S. dollar from 1994 to 2005. Even though China has become the world’s 
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largest exporter, RMB was largely not circulating freely outside China, and the 
country’s international trade has mainly been conducted in foreign currencies such 
as the U.S. dollar, the Japanese yen and recently the Euro. 
 
In the meantime, as the fastest growing major economy in the world, China 
needs to possess monetary autonomy. To maintain its fixed exchange regime, 
China has adopted capital controls on cross-border capital flows as the major 
policy tool among exchange regime policies options. China’s capital control is 
one of the most effective in the world (Xiao & Kimball, 2004), and 
complementary interventions in the FOREX market by its central bank, People’s 
Bank of China (PBoC), only serve in the case of urgent need.  
 
Under the fixed exchange rate regime, RMB has experienced several different 
exchange rates against the U.S. dollar. Following the breakdown of the 
Bretton-Woods System, RMB was briefly pegged to a “basket of currencies” from 
1978 to 1980. From 1981 to1984, two valuation channels existed for RMB: the 
fixed official exchange rate and the internal exchange rate for companies 
conducting foreign trade. The exchange rate was set by the official channel and 
foreigners could not use RMB in China. In 1985, the exchange regime was 
switched back to the single channel of government rate, and RMB experienced 
continuous nominal devaluations under government intervention, until it became 
pegged at 8.2 RMB=1 USD in 1994 (Figure 7). It is widely believed that RMB is 
undervalued by a large margin at this rate (IMF, 2010; Goldstein & Lardy, 2005). 
 
The continuous devaluations of RMB from 1978 to1994 and its long-lasting 
undervalued rate with U.S. Dollar since 1994 has boosted China’s exports to the 
rest of the world, as policy makers in China have intentionally chosen to do so 
(Funke, 2004; Plasschaert, 2011). The exports sector experienced enormous 
expansion during this period, growing from 18.69% in 2004 to 40.97% of China’s 
total GDP in 2005: an annual real growth rate of 18.8%. Along with investment, 
exports also became China’s main engine for economic growth (Yu, 2009). 
 
Figure 7: RMB/USD Exchange Rate and Exports’ Share in China’s GDP 
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 Source: Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis. China Bureau of Statistics. 
 
The reason for policy makers to favor exports was historical. When the 
country’s economic reforms first took place in 1980s, China had two main 
political and economic objectives at hand: improve people’s income and living 
conditions and update its backward production technology to catch up with other 
advanced economies. The most apparent comparative advantage China had in that 
time was the large amount of human labor. The manufacturing industry, which 
was favored by foreign consumers and required relatively little specialized skills, 
started to gain dominance in China’s economy, shifting focus away from heavy 
industries in the command economy era. At the same time, exports also attracted 
capital inflow from foreign entities and technology spillover, driving high levels 
of economic growth and boosting the employment rate. Measuring these benefits, 
the government has attempted to increase the competitiveness of Chinese exports 
by undervaluing RMB through capital control.  
 
In the past thirty years, China has grown to be the world’s largest exporter. 
However, problems have emerged. The extremely large volume of Chinese 
exports not only created an imbalance in global trade, but also formed an 
extremely imbalanced economic structure in China, characterized by low 
household consumption and a high savings rate (Blanchard & Giavazzi, 2005). 
Household consumption’s share in China’s GDP has stayed constantly between 40% 
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and 50%, not only much lower than Western economies’ rate of over 60% (for 
example, 74% in U.S., 66% in U.K.), but also below that of other East Asian 
economies with high-saving rates (54% of South Korea, 59% of Japan) (Aziz & 
Cui, 2007). The share has fallen even lower since 2000, accompanied by a 
growing share of saving, which surpassed 50% of GDP in 2006 (Figure 8). 
 
Figure 8: Percentage share of Exports, Consumption and Saving in China’s economy 
 
Source: China Bureau of Statistics. 
 
As a consequence, China has faced both internal and external pressures to 
reevaluate its currency. International trading partners have long called for a higher 
valued RMB to correct their current accounts, and domestic economy presents an 
urgent demand for a more balanced structure. In 2005, the government allowed 
RMB to appreciate by an instant 2.1% against U.S. dollar, with PBoC announcing 
that RMB would no longer be pegged solely to the US dollar. RMB has since 
started a gradual but decisive appreciation against the U.S. dollar.  
 
The financial crisis that struck in 2007 further solidified China’s decision to 
move away from an export-heavy economy. As export volume slumped by 17% 
and swept thousands of exporters into bankruptcy, the sustainability of 
export-driven growth was highly questioned. In 2010, China’s National People’s 
Congress passed the country’s twelfth Five-Year Plan, which announced a new 
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model for China’s development: the focus of economic development would be 
shifted to improving domestic income and consumption level. The Plan also 
announced that “diluted attention” should be paid to GDP growth, which implies 
lower dependence on investment. 
 
The new model of economic development has had a huge impact on China’s 
currency regime. With China’s dependency on exports alleviated, movements in 
the exchange rate have become possible, allowing more freedom for RMB 
appreciation. On the other hand, in order to increase the level of consumption, an 
appreciation of RMB will also boost domestic consumers’ purchasing power of 
foreign goods. The current move of RMB appreciation is gradual, but it is aimed 
at approaching its real exchange rate and eventually a floating exchange rate in 
the foreseeable future, thus decreasing the need for capital control (Leung & Yim, 
2009).   
 
China’s Financial System and Capital Control 
 
While China has long been under a fixed exchange regime, it could have done 
so through the intervention of PBoC. The disadvantage of this policy choice 
would be the sacrifice of monetary policy autonomy and the cost associated with 
keeping large amount of foreign exchange reserve. China has instead adopted 
capital control at the cost of disfavoring international capital flows. 
  
However, capital control may well have been beneficial for China during the 
past years of its initial economic development. International capital flows can be 
harmful for a country’s development when its financial system is weak (Reisen & 
Soto). Thus, the prevention of capital mobility across its border protects China’s 
financial system (Gu & Sheng, 2005), as it has been underdeveloped due to 
historical and political reasons. While the unclear definition of property rights and 
China’s current fiscal regime also contribute at some level to the necessity of 
capital control (Yu, 2009), two critical conditions consistently dominate China’s 
financial system: the lack of diversified financial services, and the dominance of 
state banks in the banking sector. In the following section, I detail the past 
condition of China’s financial sector and discuss how capital control has protected 
it against external shocks, as well as how recent improvements have been made so 
less dependence on capital control is present.  
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 Before 1949, China’s financial system was well developed. While traditional 
forms of capitalism can be traced back as early as the Song Dynasty (11th century). 
Contact with the West brought modern capitalism to China in the late 19th century, 
and financial activities boomed in the coastal region (Jarvis, 2007). It was during 
this period that Shanghai transformed itself from an agricultural town into a 
full-fledged IFC of the Far East. In 1936, China possessed a large number of 
banks, trust companies and private lenders, concentrated in a few centers such as 
Shanghai and Tianjin. Merchants in Shanghai used up to eleven currencies in 
transaction, and the need for hedging against risk also spawned a large insurance 
industry.  
 
All financial institutions were nationalized in 1949 following the communist 
takeover to form the People’s Bank of China (PBoC), a government entity under 
the Ministry of Finance that served both as the central bank and the sole 
commercial bank. Under the command economy, PBoC disbursed investments 
and operating funds according to centralized government fiat. It was not until 
1978 that the economic reforms took place regarding the financial sector. PBoC 
departed the Ministry of Finance to become a separate entity in 1979, and three 
spinoffs were created for commercial banking purposes: Agricultural Bank of 
China (ABC), which was in charge of banking in all rural areas; Bank of China 
(BOC), which conducted foreign related banking services; China Construction 
Bank (CCB), which financed investments in infrastructure construction. PBoC 
was also mandated to serve the sole function of the country’s central bank. In 
1984, PBoC created another spin-off for commercial transaction services: 
Industrial and Commercial Bank of China (ICBC). ABC, BOC, CCB and ICBC 
thus form the Big Four banks of China, which inherited PBOC’s monolithic 
presence from the era of a centrally-planned economy, and have been in the 
dominant position in the financial system since their creation. 
 
The decade of 1980 has seen rapid development in joint-stock and city 
commercial banks, as well as rural credit cooperatives (RCCs). Foreign banks 
also made their re-entrance to China and started operating in 1990. Insurance 
companies and asset management companies also emerged in waves along with 
development in the financial services industry. All these developments toward a 
diversified financial system, however, have not been able to challenge the Big 
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Four’s dominant position
 
Figure 9: Composition of Chi
 Source: China Banking Regulatory Commission.
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reform.  
 
Wielding their dominant position in the banking sector, SOBs caused the most 
critical problem in China’s financial system--the large amount of non-performing 
loans (NPLs). After their spin-off from PBoC, the Big Four SOBs were still 
managed under the influence of command economy, and continued their lending 
practice to inefficient SOEs. They disbursed credit loans outlined by the central 
authorities, much of which went to SOEs who were facing severe structural 
problems and fierce market competition during 1980s-1990s. Starting from 1992, 
the reforms of SOEs lost them government support, putting the last straw on many 
SOEs’ bankruptcy. This period created an astonishing level of NPLs on the Big 
Four’s balance sheet, and in the whole financial system due to their dominant 
position (Table 9). While official data reported a NPL level of 25%, scholars 
estimated it could be as high as 60% of total loans before the Asian financial crisis 
(Shirai, 2001).  
 
Table 9: Size of NPLs (billion USD) and their percentage in GDP (in brackets) by country. 
Year China United States South Korea India Indonesia 
1997 -- 66.9 (0.8%) 16.2 (3.1%) -- 19.6 (6.5%) 
1998 20.5 (2%) 71.3 (0.8%) 23.2 (6.7%) 12.7 (3.1%) 21.8 (7.9%) 
1999 105.1 (9.7%) 72.2 (0.8%) 54.4 (12.2%) 14 (3.2%) 27.2 (9.1%) 
2000 269.3 (22.5%) 90.1 (0.9%) 35.5 (6.9%) 12.9 (2.8%) 33.2 
(10.3%) 
2001 265.3 (20.0%) 108.4 (1.1%) 12.2 (2.5%) 13.2 (2.8%) 37.9 (13%) 
2002 188.4 (13%) 107.8 (1.0%) 9.9 (1.8%) 14.8 (3%) 30.7 
(10.4%) 
2003 181.2 (11%) 95.9 (1.0%) 11.7 (1.9%) 14.6 (2.5%) 23.1 (7.7%) 
2004 207.4 (10.7%) 81.3 (0.9%) 10.0 (1.5%) 14.4 (2.2%) 16.4 (5.1%) 
2005 164.2 (7.3%) 84.6 (0.7%) 7.6 (1%) 13.4 (1.7%) 11.2 (3.2%) 
2006 160.3 (6.3%) 88.8 (0.7%) 7.4 (0.8%) 11.8 (1.4%) -- 
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Source: Allen et al. (2008). 
 
It is commonly accepted that NPL level should be kept below 15% of total 
loans, otherwise systemic crisis can result in the financial system. In 1997, 
Thailand and South Korea faced major banking crises when investors realized 
their high level of NPLs (Yu, 2009; Yoon, 1998), which caused the two countries 
35% and 28% of GDP (Caprio & Klingebiel, 2003). China’s NPL level was much 
higher than the two countries above. The only reason it escaped the crisis largely 
unscathed was due to heavy capital control: in October 1998, China’s Supreme 
Court called for a major crackdown on FOREX activities, and hundreds of 
underground FOREX traders were prosecuted. The government also tracked down 
and recovered capital flight for enterprises and financial institutions, bring 
FOREX exchange reserves to normal levels under capital control. 
 
However, even though its financial system escaped the Asian financial crisis, 
the government, alarmed, decided to take steps to reform the banking sector. In 
1999, the government led the establishment of four asset management companies 
(AMCs) to securitize the Big Four’s NPLs. In the following years, AMCs 
absorbed $ 169 billion of NPLs and disposed of them by debt-equity swaps, sale 
to investors and other market instruments. NPL growth slowed down, but its value 
and ratio remained large. The authorities realized that NPL problem within SOBs 
were not only purely functional, but were also reflecting their structural problems, 
such as continuation of government-directed lending and lack of efficient 
supervision. 
 
In 2003, the China Banking Regulatory Commission (CBRC) was formed to 
take over the responsibility from PBoC of overseeing the banking industry, while 
the latter established its second headquarter in Shanghai. In addition, the Big Four 
SOBs were transformed into joint-stock banks to become internationally 
competitive. In order to clean up the NPL problem and their low capital adequacy 
finally, the government injected $ 45 billion that went in equal portion into CCB 
and BOC in 2003. In 2005, a $40 billion and $35 billion injection went into ICBC 
and ABC. After ten years of continuing efforts, China’s Banking System has 
eventually obtained an acceptable level of NPLs and attained adequate capital 
adequacy ratio.  
 
Further steps were taken to attract global partners into the Big Four and 
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increase their management performance. In 2005, CCB became listed on SSE and 
HKS, and ICBC and BOC also became public in 2006. ABC, the last of the four, 
became simultaneously listed on HKS and SSE in 2010, and topped the record set 
by ICBC to become the largest IPO in the world. With foreign and public 
ownership, the performance of Big Four has improved with updated management 
structure (Figure 10).  
 
Figure 10: Moody’s Long-Term Bank Deposit Rating of China’s Big Four SOBs. 
1995-2010. 
 
Source: Moody’s.  
 
With the rest of China’s financial system enjoying relatively healthier growth, 
Big Four’s improvement in performance has put the entire banking sector on a 
new track for development. Chinese banks have become eager to expand their 
business overseas, and their capacities in cross-border transaction increased along 
with acquisitions of foreign financial institutions6. While problems such as 
nepotism and susceptibility to government intervention still exist in SOBs, their 
performance has been largely satisfactory. While it may still exist, the need for 
capital control to protect China’s financial sector has been gradually fading away. 
                                                        
6
 Wall Street Journal, June 29, 2010 
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 RMB Internationalization and Current Situation in Capital Control  
 
Authorities have taken a cautious step-by-step approach in alleviating China’s 
capital control. In 2002, the Qualified Foreign Institutional Investor (QFII) 
Scheme allowed foreign investors to invest in the domestic equity market. Its 
counterpart, Qualified Domestic Institutional Investor (QDII) Scheme was 
introduced in 2006. In May 2005, PBoC allowed a gradual “managed” float of 
RMB vis-à-vis USD, which is actually a crawling peg of RMB to a basket of 
currencies: U.S. dollar, Euro, Japanese yen, South Korean won, and small 
portions of other currencies. RMB has since started appreciating against the US 
dollar, Euro and other major currencies. In the wake of the 2008 global financial 
crisis and the decline of confidence in U.S. dollar’s value, China has increasingly 
felt the need to improve the status of its own currency. 
 
In July 2009, PBoC, CBRC, China Ministry of Finance, China Ministry of 
Commerce, China General Administration of Customs, China State 
Administration of Tax jointly announced the Administrative Rules on Pilot 
Program of Renminbi Settlement of Cross-border of Trade Transactions (“Rules”). 
Hong Kong, Macau and countries in Association of Southeast Asian Nations 
(ASEAN) can participate in China’s pilot scheme for RMB cross-border 
transaction as offshore regions. Shanghai, and four cities in Guangdong province 
(Shenzhen, Guangzhou, Zhuhai and Dongguan) are designated to be the onshore 
pilot cities. On July 6th, Bank of China (Hong Kong) and Bank of China’s 
Shanghai branch completed the first cross-border trade settlement denominated in 
RMB, marking the initial step of reforms in the internationalization of China’s 
currency. 
 
  Authorities expanded the designated cities and provinces in RMB cross-border 
transaction to 20 in 2010. That same year, the volume of trade settled in RMB 
reached $58 billion USD, representing 2% of China’s total trade. RMB deposit in 
Hong Kong expanded 378%, and is expected to rise to 15% of Hong Kong’s total 
deposit by end of 2011 (Ulrich et al., 2011). While the initial plan was to 
internationalize RMB through three stages--currency of trade settlement, currency 
of pricing and currency of reserves--the rapid growth in RMB demand has made 
Malaysia the first to purchase RMB bond as its FOREX reserve in 2010.  
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   Under the broad context of RMB internationalization, the strength of capital 
control has again been weakening. According to State Administration of Foreign 
Exchange (SAFE), among 40 items of capital account, 5 have been completely 
liberalized, 17 partially liberalized, 8 under moderate restriction, while only 10 
are completely prohibited. Early calculations based on IMF’s formula showed that 
more than 80% of China’s capital account has been at least partially liberalized 
(Yu, 2009). However, because China is the only country that internationalizes its 
currency without fully lifting the capital control, the RMB’s internationalization 
has been separated between the offshore and onshore markets, making RMB 
difficult to flow back into China. The change came in mid-2010, when PBoC 
authorized foreign institutions to enter the China’s onshore Interbank Bond 
Market. Shortly after, PBoC Shanghai and Shanghai Municipal Government 
authorized experimental RMB cross-border settlement in capital account. 
 
As pointed out by Jaccard & Neoh (2009), the long waited move to RMB 
internationalization may proceed far more quickly than expected. The consequent 
alleviation of capital control and increased international capital flows will impact 
enormously China’s financial system, as well as Shanghai’s IFC status. As the 
largest financial center in China and a host of central bank’s headquarters, 
Shanghai is on its way to become the onshore center of RMB settlement.  
 
VI. Conclusion 
 
Having gone through falls and rises in history, Shanghai today stands as the 
dominant financial center of China and is perched to realize its ambition of 
re-emerging as the leading IFC of the world in the near future. Much of its current 
achievement has been based on China’s growth and consequent advancement in 
political and economic institutions. While China continues growing strongly into 
the near future, Shanghai will enjoy the benefits disproportionately due to its 
position in the economy, which will eventually transform it into the future’s 
leading IFC. 
 
While Shanghai’s position in the national economy has already been secured, 
and hard infrastructure constructions largely completed, the two most important 
aspects of its IFC development are still underway: capital market and cross-border 
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capital flow. Currently, the capital market in Shanghai has passed the initial level 
of development after twenty years of high growth and presents itself as a 
significant challenge to those on other leading IFCs such as Tokyo and London. 
However, it is still relatively immature in terms of its capital depth, international 
openness, and diversity of mechanisms and instruments. Changes in China’s 
economy have enabled its further development into the future, and recent progress 
made in the capital market will help Shanghai become a direct competitor with 
established centers.  
 
Shanghai’s cross-border capital flow is nascent compared to centers in 
developed economies, and even less mature in regards to its capital market 
development. The reason is largely due to China’s capital control regime that 
found the need to keep exchange rates fixed and protect the weak financial system. 
Recent changes in China’s political economy have alleviated its need for an 
export-driven economy, and the long-term reforms in the banking sector have 
successfully improved the financial system’s health. The need for capital control 
is further weakened as China gradually appreciates its currency, RMB, toward a 
floating exchange rate and starts its internationalization process. While 
cross-border capital flow is expected to increase in China, Shanghai will benefit 
directly as the onshore RMB center and claim larger importance in the global 
economy. 
 
In summary, Shanghai is currently heading in the right direction of becoming 
one of the world’s leading IFCs. In the future, Shanghai will likely become an IFC 
that concentrates on domestic capital need, while exerting influence in global 
market through its large capital market and status as onshore center for Chinese 
currency. This development will depend largely on China’s macro-economic 
policies, which in general look promising. 
 
 
 
Appendix I. Historical Events and Financial Sector Evolution in Shanghai 
Year Event Note Year Event Note 
1842 
Shanghai 
becomes an 
open port 
Under the 
Treaty of 
Nanjing. 
1994 
Establishment of 
FOREX Trading 
Center in 
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Guangzhou, 
Xiamen, 
Fuzhou, 
Ningbo became 
open port, 
Hong Kong 
ceded to Britain 
Shanghai 
1847 
First Foreign 
Bank in 
Shanghai 
“Oriental 
Banking 
Corporation” 
1997 
Establishment of 
National 
Interbank Bond 
Market 
 
1891 
Establishment 
of Shanghai 
Stock 
Exchange 
Known as 
“Shanghai 
Sharebrokers’ 
Association” 
1999 
Establishment of 
Shanghai Futures 
Exchange 
 
1897 
First 
Domestic 
Bank in 
Shanghai 
“Imperial Bank 
of China” 2001 
China joins World 
Trade 
Organization 
 
1921 
Establishment 
of 
Communist 
Party of 
China in 
Shanghai 
 2002 
Establishment of 
Shanghai Gold 
Exchange 
 
1937 
Battle of 
Shanghai and 
consequent 
Japanese 
occupation 
 2002 
Qualified Foreign 
Institutional 
Investors (QFII) 
scheme 
 
1945 
Surrender of 
Japan and 
liberalization 
of Shanghai 
 2003 
Establishment of 
China Banking 
Regulatory 
Commission 
Spinoff 
from 
PBoC 
1948 Establishment 
of People’s 
Based on 
consolidation 2005 
Reforms in 
non-tradable 
Completed 
in 
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Bank of 
China 
(PBoC) 
of Huabei 
Bank, Beihai 
Bank and Xibei 
Farmers’ Bank 
shares 2007-2008 
1949 
Shanghai 
overtaken by 
communist 
army 
 2005 
Renminbi 
abandons U.S. 
Dollar peg 
“Managed 
floating 
peg” to a 
basket of 
currencies 
1978 
Beginning of 
China’s 
Economic 
Reforms 
 2005 
Establishment of 
second 
headquarters of 
PBoC in Shanghai 
 
1979 
Reform of 
PBoC: 
Agricultural 
Bank of 
China (ABC) 
and Bank of 
China (BOC) 
Two PBoC 
spinoffs 2006 
IPO of BOC and 
ICBC  
1983 
Establishment 
of China 
Construction 
Bank (CCB) 
PBoC spinoff Jun, 2006 
Qualified 
Domestic 
Institutional 
Investors (QDII) 
scheme 
 
1984 
Establishment 
of Industrial 
and 
Commercial 
Bank of 
China (ICBC) 
PBoC spinoff 2006 
Establishment of 
China Financial 
Futures Exchange 
 
Apr, 
1990 
Shanghai 
starts 
Economic 
Reforms 
 2009 
State Council 
announces plan to 
build Shanghai 
into International 
Financial and 
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Shipping Center 
Dec. 
1990 
Shanghai 
Stock 
Exchange 
Reestablished 
 2009 
First RMB 
cross-border 
settlement 
Shanghai 
as one of 
five 
onshore 
pilot cities 
1990 
Foreign 
Banks 
allowed 
commercial 
operations in 
Shanghai 
 
April, 
2010 
Stock Index 
Futures launched  
Jun, 
1992 
FOREX 
futures 
trading 
Ended 1993 May, 2010 
Shanghai hosts 
World Exposition  
Jun, 
1992 
Warrant 
trading Ended 1996 
Jun, 
2010 IPO of ABC 
Largest 
IPO in 
world 
history 
1992 
Establishment 
of China 
Securities 
Regulatory 
Commission 
Responsibilities 
takeover from 
PBoC 
completed in 
1997 
Aug, 
2010 
Foreign financial 
institutions 
allowed to invest 
in Interbank RMB 
market 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Appendix II. Reed’s IFC Evaluation Variables 
 
Stage 1: Banking Variables 
 
LBHDQ : Local Bank Headquarters: Large internationally active commercial 
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banks headquartered in the international financial center.  
 
LBDIL: Local Bank Direct Links: Foreign international financial centers with 
direct links to the international financial center through the large internationally 
active local banks headquartered in the international financial center.  
 
PB: Private Bank: Private (merchant or investment) banks with an office in the 
international financial center.  
 
FBO: Foreign Bank Office: Large internationally active foreign commercial 
banks with an office in the international financial center.  
 
FBDIL: Foreign Bank Direct Links: Foreign international financial centers 
with direct links to the international financial center through the large 
internationally active foreign banks with an office in the financial international 
center.  
 
Stage 2: Financial/Banking Variables 
 
FFA: Foreign Financial Assets: The total amount of foreign financial assets of 
the international financial center (allocated on the basis of the total assets of the 
center's LBHDQs). 
 
FFL: Foreign Financial Liabilities: The total amount of foreign financial 
liabilities held in the international financial center (allocated on the basis of the 
total liabilities of the center's LBHDQs).  
 
LBR/DIL: Local Bank Representative/Branch Direct Links: Foreign 
international financial centers with direct links (that is, branches and 
representative offices) to the international financial center through local banks 
(head-quartered there).  
 
FB/RO: Foreign Bank Representative Office: Large internationally active 
foreign commercial banks with branches or representative offices in the 
international financial center. 
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 Appendix III. Top 45 IFCs ranked by Global Financial Centres Index 
(GFIC) and Xinhua-Dow Jones IFC Development Index 
Centers 2007 2008 2009 2010 Xinhua-Dow 
Jones Index 
New York 787 774 774 770 88.4 
London 806 791 790 772 87.7 
Tokyo 625 642 674 697 85.6 
Hong Kong 697 700 729 760 81.0 
Paris 622 607 630 645 72.8 
Singapore 673 701 719 728 70.1 
Frankfurt 649 636 649 659 64.4 
Shanghai 527 568 655 693 63.8 
Washington D.C. 589 600 630 649 61.1 
Sydney 636 630 651 660 59.5 
Zurich 666 676 676 669 59.4 
Chicago 639 641 661 678 56.8 
Beijing 482 509 613 653 55.9 
Dubai 575 597 617 607 53.6 
Amsterdam 599 590 586 595 53.0 
Geneva 645 645 660 661 52.3 
San Francisco 608 620 634 654 49.6 
Toronto 613 624 647 656 46.5 
Boston 621 625 634 655 45.2 
Copenhagen 488 548 560 573 41.0 
Munich 535 578 588 610 40.9 
Brussels 546 559 568 582 40.5 
Shenzhen - - 695 654 40.5 
Vancouver 525 580 589 627 40.0 
Stockholm 554 569 569 587 39.3 
Luxembourg 596 622 637 634 37.2 
Vienna 515 530 555 571 37.1 
Helsinki 518 534 533 549 37.1 
Oslo 500 534 538 557 36.0 
Melbourne 588 586 584 622 35.5 
Seoul 464 502 576 621 35.0 
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Madrid 516 525 560 584 34.8 
Montreal 538 579 586 617 34.5 
Rome 479 467 537 563 34.5 
Moscow - 414 462 506 34.2 
Milan 519 541 554 577 34.0 
Dublin 605 622 613 605 33.5 
Osaka 502 493 565 601 33.0 
Sao Paulo 434 471 560 573 32.2 
Mumbai 470 497 542 550 31.5 
Taipei - - 609 639 31.0 
Buenos Aires - - 507 528 25.6 
Budapest - 374 425 467 25.5 
Lisbon 422 430 477 534 24.1 
Johannesburg 463 525 550 555 22.5 
Source: GFIC 1-8, Xinhua – Dow Jones 
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